This is the third part of my series on Obama’s foreign policy with regards to Russia. Part one covered events prior to Obama and part two covered his attempts at bilateral cooperation with the Russian Federation. This time, we’ll be covering events in Syria.
Syria had been ruled by Bashar al Assad since the early 2000s.
Starting in 2011, the country was wracked by civil protests, government repression, civil war, invasion, mass emigration, really just privation and destruction on a catastrophic scale. This isn’t an in-depth narrative of that conflict – instead, we’re going to be outlining the basic events of the conflict, then focus our attention on how the US and Russia reacted to and tried to influence the outcome of, those events. Finally, we’ll tie everything back to the Russia Reset and see if the two countries managed more cooperation than competition here.
3.1 War Begins
In March 2011 the Arab Spring arrived in Bashar al Assad’s Syria. Recent developments in the country – population increases, a severe drought and resulting water crisis, the impoverishment of the many (and the enrichment of the few) resulting from a decade of economic privatization and liberalization – had created a large population of disenchanted Syrians, particularly in the countryside and on the fringes of its major cities. The events of the Arab Spring provided an outlet for public expression of this discontent.
When anti-government protests erupted, officials responded with force and repression. Assad justified the use of force by painting the protesters as Sunni extremists akin to al Qaeda and as part of a foreign conspiracy to oust his government from power. Whether true or not in the beginning, it soon became a self-fulfilling prophesy as Sunni jihadists did flock to Syria to fight against Assad’s government and powers both great and regional poured money and equipment and influence into the country.1
In May 2011, the Obama administration announced personal sanctions against Assad and several senior members of his regime. Days later Obama gave a speech where, after months of US equivocation, he painted a broad picture of the US response to the Arab Spring. It was a speech of ideas rather than concrete policy. He emphasized how US security interests were entwined with the promotion of its “core values”; said that the US would continue its traditional role in the region (maintaining commerce and security) while innovating in the face of a changing political landscape; and promised that those innovations in US policy would promote democratization, economic liberalization, religious liberty, women’s rights, and individual self-determination. After mentioning Tunisia and Egypt, where leaders and governments were already changing, he listed other countries:
Libya, where an international response was defending a people against its murderous leader;
Syria, where sanctions would help push the government to the negotiating table;
Iran, where protestors were hypocritically supported abroad while suppressed at home. US allies were also mentioned:
Yemen and Bahrain, where human rights needed to be better honored;
Iraq, where the promise of democracy shone bright.2
Curiously, no mention was made of staunch US allies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or Israel – each responsible for its own human rights abuses. Nor was mention made of the rampant and ongoing police violence in the United States, which while it hadn’t made headlines recently was poised to return to newscasts in the wake of militarized police riots in Ferguson, MO starting in 2014.
While Syria was only mentioned briefly, Obama did call on Assad either to lead a legitimate reform effort or “step out of the way.” Since Assad proclaimed the majority of the protestors to be illegitimate, he was not likely to usher in a fundamental reform of Syria’s government. He considered his modest reform proposals to be good enough. Thus, Obama’s words probably fed into Assad’s notion of a foreign conspiracy to oust him from power – not an unreasonable fear, as the US has a long history of removing governments and leaders it does not find preferable.
With Assad ignoring Western protestations in favor of continued repression, the protesters hardened into several armed factions, united in their hatred of Assad but unable to agree on what would take his place. In July, Syrian army defectors formed the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Though initially created to protect peaceful demonstrators, the FSA soon broadened its political imagination, ultimately seeking as its sole political objective the removal of Assad from power. The FSA was opposed within Opposition ranks by radical Salafi groups like Ahrar al-Sham, formed in December 2011, which sought to replace Assad with an Islamist government.
In the wake of escalating violence came more direct calls in the West for Assad to give up power. In August president Obama called for Assad to step down, his words echoed by western allies and some local Arab powers. Although he faced a growing international backlash, Assad was not completely isolated. Russia remained his chief patron, shielding Syria from UN-backed action through the judicious use of its Security Council veto. In the face of international paralysis, thousands of Syrians had already perished and by the end of the year the country descended into civil war.
Over the coming years, multiple overlapping campaigns would come to comprise this conflict.
The original fight between government and opposition forces;
The fighting that erupted between the Islamic State (ISIS) and anti-ISIS forces since 2013 (some for and some against Assad);
Turkish operations against Syrian Kurds.
The overlapping loyalties, conflicting goals, and multiple vectors of conflict complicated the war, making intervention a tricky prospect indeed.
Regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Turkey backed opposition forces (although not always the same forces); Iran backed Assad. Among the larger powers, Russia unambiguously backed Assad, for Syria was a decades-long ally that, critically, leased the naval base at Tartus to Russia (the only Russian naval base on the Mediterranean Sea). The US, on the other hand, wanted Assad gone.
Having had little success in brokering peace, the UN and the Arab League sought to enlist the international powers in support of a political settlement to the conflict. In June 2012 an international conference organized by the UN produced the Geneva Communiqué and a road map for negotiations to establish a transitional government for Syria. The United States and Russia proved unable to agree on whether Assad would be included in a future Syrian government. This ambiguity scuttled the effort. Fighting continued, with rebel victories in the summer but stalemate by year’s end.
3.2 The Red Line
Aloof from the carnage and chaos stood the United States. Though the US had been a longtime foe of Baathist Syria, the most circumspect of US policymakers (which included the president) remained chastened by their recent experiences in the Middle East and thus reticent to involve US troops and resources recklessly. Back in March 2011, Obama had directly cited Iraq as a cautionary tale of the foolhardy use of military power. Secretary Clinton also dismissed the possibility of direct US military intervention, citing a lack of Syrian desire for such action.3 Policymakers were also wary of giving military support to anti-Assad rebels only to inadvertently give succor to terrorist groups.4 But these same politicians had recently rejoiced at the death of Osama bin Laden and the overthrow of Gadhafi in Libya. Perhaps, if done correctly, the US could intervene after all?
But Syria was not Libya. Although his army was demoralized and disarrayed, Assad was much more heavily armed than Gadhafi had been, with access to both large storehouses of chemical weapons and modern air defense systems. Assad also possessed more domestic support than Gadhafi had enjoyed and benefitted from the disorganized Opposition whose diffuse members spent as much time arguing with each other as they did fighting Assad.5
In the face of these obstacles, US leadership debated continuously over the course of 2011 and 2012, trying to figure out how best to shape events in their interest. Panetta, Petraeus, and Clinton supported large increases in military aid to rebel groups, arguing that lack of weapons was hampering their fighting strength. But, argued “top brass” in the military, it would require a massive commitment in order to surmount Assad’s defenses and establish a No-Fly zone. Moreover, the rebels were divided and, more to the point, tainted by Islamist factions hostile to US interests, making it incredibly risky to send them large quantities of arms and munitions. As even the hawkish Clinton admitted:
The story of the mujahideen in Afghanistan remained a powerful cautionary tale never far from anyone’s mind.6
The situation was further complicated by the fact that Assad benefited from his status as a Russian client. So while many US talking heads of both political parties called for something to be done, no easy answer presented itself and there seemed little stomach among US politicians or the electorate for a large-scale military intervention into the country. Amid US inaction, the various factions received money and weapons from other sources, and the fighting continued apace.
More alarming than the conventional violence was the scourge of chemical weapons. Throughout 2012 evidence had slowly accumulated that Assad’s forces were using chemical weapons, deploying them in an effort to salvage an increasingly dire military situation. On August 20, 2012, Obama made a spontaneous yet significant statement during a press conference:
We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my equation.7
366 days later, a suspected chemical weapons attack occurred in the suburbs of Damascus, killing hundreds. While Assad denied that his forces has used chemical agents, the evidence was strong enough that the Obama administration finally felt compelled to respond. Given his “red line” pronouncement the previous year, many presumed that the president would engage in some sort of military response.
The concentrated use of US troops (perhaps in the mold of Desert Storm) would ensure that Assad’s weapons were found and destroyed. It is possible that in a vacuum, and without the costly examples of Afghanistan and Iraq still smoldering in the background, Obama might seriously have considered this option. He was no pacifist. Although Obama did not run for office to be a War President, a leader defined by the gleam of his saber and the smell of gunpowder in his wake, his 2008 campaign did stress, again and again, that US security mattered, that terrorism needed to be fought, that Afghanistan was a good war that needed to be won. Once in office, Obama and his administration argued and feuded over the surge in Afghanistan and the drawdown in Iraq, but ultimately, this liberal president and his predominantly liberal cabinet massively increased the depth of the US campaign in Afghanistan as well as the breadth of the drone campaign across the Greater Middle East. Over the course of his second term, Obama would oversee the drastic expansion of the War on Terror across the African continent as well.
But these military operations were, except for Afghanistan, unconventional: special operations, drone strikes, cruise missile strikes, local proxies. The Pentagon argued that in order to be effective, a deployment to Syria would require nearly as many troops as the US currently deployed to Afghanistan. Since regime change was also official US policy at this point, it also meant that the United States would be required to take on the responsibility of either reforming or replacing Assad. All of that risked a thorny confrontation with Russia.8
That left air strikes (which were not likely to stop Assad’s chemical attacks in any event) and/or increased material support for rebel groups (hampered by the polyglot composition of the Opposition). Neither option was as dramatic or climactic (or cinematic?) as many had envisioned when Obama demarcated his chemical Rubicon, but then, no one seemed to agree on what the US should do – only that it had to do something.
But even air strikes were not without political and military risk. Understandably, Obama did not want to shoulder the blame for escalation by himself, so he reached out to Congress. On August 31st Obama announced that he had asked Congress to debate the matter and vote on authorizing a military intervention in Syria. His calculus reflected both his predecessor’s understanding of presidential war powers (that they were almost unlimited) but also the recognition that even a legally correct presidential action might not be prudent after more than a decade of war:
Now, this attack is an assault on human dignity. It also presents a serious danger to our national security. It risks making a mockery of the global prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. It endangers our friends and our partners along Syria’s borders, including Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq. It could lead to escalating use of chemical weapons or their proliferation to terrorist groups who would do our people harm. In a world with many dangers, this menace must be confronted…
I’m confident in the case our Government has made without waiting for U.N. inspectors. I’m comfortable going forward without the approval of a United Nations Security Council that, so far, has been completely paralyzed and unwilling to hold Asad accountable….[W]hile I believe I have the authority to carry out this military action without specific congressional authorization, I know that the country will be stronger if we take this course, and our actions will be even more effective.9
Having outlined the why and the what, Obama ends this speech with an articulation of the liberal world order, led by the United States, that echoes the language Clinton employed in the first days of the post Cold War era.
But we are the United States of America, and we cannot and must not turn a blind eye to what happened in Damascus. Out of the ashes of world war, we built an international order and enforced the rules that gave it meaning. And we did so because we believe that the rights of individuals to live in peace and dignity depends on the responsibilities of nations. We aren’t perfect, but this Nation more than any other has been willing to meet those responsibilities.10
Obama is using much the same language that Clinton used when arguing for intervention in Yugoslavia (or that W Bush used when arguing for intervention in Iraq): the US has a responsibility to lead and act on the world stage.
That Obama thought he could authorize military action in Syria without Congressional approval is a legacy of the long and persistent increase in presidential power after World War II, especially under his predecessor, George W Bush, who viewed presidential war powers as practically unlimited. That Obama calculated that it would be wise to involve Congress reflected the recognition that, even a legally correct presidential action might not be prudent after a decade of war.
Critics said this gave Obama an easy out, for he could blame Republican intractability for what was, at base, a lack of presidential resolve. Supporters countered that this was a welcomed return to a more balanced federal government, one where the chief executive no longer acted as if it had sole and complete authority in the realm of foreign affairs. As is often but not always the case, two extremes both had a point. Obama was passing the buck onto Congress because he did not want to make a controversial military decision and understood the political power of having the legislature support military action. And while his going to Congress did speak to something of a more restrained interpretation of presidential power, his speech made clear that fundamentally he legally had the ability to do this without Congress – this was almost more of a courtesy.
At any rate, while direct US military action lost itself in a labyrinth of congressional debate and Opposition forces benefited from a slowly increasing supply of arms and equipment, Assad was denuded of his chemical weapons stockpiles through diplomatic means. Seeing an opportunity to play the part of magnanimous powerbroker, Russian officials approached their US counterparts, saying that they might be able to use their influence over Assad to convince him to give up his chemical weapons. On September 14, Russia, Syria, and the United States agreed to place all of Syria’s chemical weapons under international control. The arrangement was carried out and all declared chemical weapons were removed from Syria by June 2014. The undeclared chemical weapons that likely remained in Assad’s arsenal and the reconstitution of at least some of his chemical capabilities in the wake of further fighting in the years ahead marred this achievement making, it at best a partial victory.11
Meanwhile, circumstances were shifting in ways that would allow Obama to use the US military without additional Congressional say so. Throughout 2013, jihadist forces were consolidating power and support among opposition groups in Syria, most notably under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (hitherto leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq). His Syrian and Iraqi forces combined into ISIS (the Islamic State), which achieved stunning victories in both countries throughout 2014.
Although originating in Syria, ISIS clearly threatened the US-backed government of Iraq. Therefore, the emergence of this new power in the region pushed Obama to escalate in turn. This meant more guns for rebels and more planes over Syria.
Still wary of the risks involved in arming Syrian rebels, Obama’s administration stressed that every effort would be made to ensure that weapons only went to vetted “moderate” rebels. The first batch of 5,400 fighters were soon trained and equipped. But as is so often the case with allies and proxy forces, just because these soldiers benefited from US support did not mean they aligned with US aims. So, when they were ordered to fight ISIS rather than Assad, many of these anti-Assad opposition fighters opted instead to join Al Qaeda affiliated groups like Al Nusra because they focused their martial prowess against the entity the soldiers actually wanted to fight: the Syrian government.12
In addition to (sometimes unreliable) allies, the US and a coalition of European and Middle Eastern states brought their air power to bear against ISIS. Aerial bombardment began in Iraq, where the US had the most at stake, but on September 23rd the United States and a coalition of Arab states expanded the air campaign to strike ISIS targets in Syria. US attention, however, remained squarely in the Iraqi theater of operations, where the Obama team was committed to propping up a client state. US and Iraqi efforts eventually quashed most ISIS fighters in Iraq by the end of 2016. In Syria ISIS remained a problem primarily for Assad, Turkey…and Russia.
3.3 Direct Russian Involvement
In Part One of this series, we delved into the weakness or passivity of Russian foreign policy in the 1990s, especially when it came to Yugoslavia. In the Middle East, this same phenomenon manifested itself in a drawing back of Soviet and then Russian activity in the region. Non-intervention became the modus operandi in the region for the next fifteen years. We then covered the perceived humiliations Russia’s leadership felt as their priorities and demands were ignored by Western leaders and mentioned Moscow’s desire to partner with the US in the Global War on Terror, a desire that clashed with the Bush administration’s conception of Russia as an auxiliary rather than a co-equal.
In Part Two we discussed how assertive and anti-Western Putin’s Russia had grown after 2005, seeking to reaffirm Russia’s status outside the hegemony of the liberal system controlled by the United States. In the context of the Middle East, this reassertiveness is most clearly shown by the renewed relationship between Assad and Putin, who drew closer to each other during this time. In 2005, Assad allowed Russia to refurbish the old Soviet naval base at Tartus, thus resuming Moscow’s direct influence in the region for the first time since the late 1980s.13
In 2015, stunning the West, Russia launched an expeditionary force into Syria, beginning its first overseas campaign since the days of the Cold War. What prompted such an risky and audacious move? Several factors were at play:
As the Syrian civil war heated up, Russia poured material support into the country, but grew increasingly concerned over the fate of its ally, especially after the rise of ISIS.
On a related point, with tens of thousands of Jihadists fighting across Syria by 2015, Russia’s leaders grew increasingly concerned about the influence those fighters might have on Chechen Muslims within Russia’s borders and the possible rise of terrorist activity aimed at the Russian Federation.
In 2014 Russia had annexed the Crimea from Ukraine and was increasingly involved in the fighting in that country. Putin had achieved much that he desired and at considerably low cost. In 2015, therefore, Putin’s government already had a successful military campaign under its belt.
In 2011, Russia had acquiesced to Western intervention against Ghadafi in Libya. The subsequent overthrow of his government and that country’s descent into the chaos of civil war made Russia very reticent to allow a similar fate to befall Assad’s Syria.
The Obama administration, hamstrung by an unhelpful Congress and the legacy of Bush’s wars, had no clear or decisive policy in Syria, which left space for others to act if they so chose.
Russia officially justified its actions as necessary to support the Syrian government in its fight against terrorism and to “stabilize the legitimate authority” of Assad.14
Whatever Putin and his spokespeople might say to the contrary, in order for Russia to bolster Assad’s faltering war effort and prevent the defeat of the Syrian army, it would have to attack Syrian Opposition forces as well as ISIS. Thus, despite Russia’s official line, starting in late September their air strikes targeted areas well outside the Islamic State’s territory. These airstrikes were the start of Operation Vozmezdie (Retribution) and targeted both moderates like the Free Syrian Army and Sunni rebels affiliated with ISIS.
Russia’s leaders took the opportunity to show off the fruits of their country’s military modernization efforts. Russian Tu-160 strategic bombers flew from the base on the Kola Peninsula all the way to the Mediterranean to launch long-range cruise missiles on targets in Syria, By October, Russian ships off the Mediterranean coast had also begun firing cruise missiles at targets almost a thousand miles away.15
As ISIS flourished and Russia intervened more directly, calls both outside and within the administration again rang out for military intervention into Syria. John McCain, a man who has never met a war he didn’t like, called for 10,000 US troops to enter Syria as part of a “coalition” force. These troops, along with a no-fly zone and drastically increased material support for Syrian rebels, were to both crush ISIS and curtail, possibly overthrow, Assad. McCain, a Republican, relied upon the same language as the Democratic president he’d lost to in 2008, assuming as a matter of course that the US had a responsibility to act in the Middle East in order to maintain its security and confront Assad, “that great butcher.” His language combined the black and white foreign policy mentality of the Cold War with the idea of the United States as the defender of the liberal world order, rhetoric pioneered by Clinton and continued by Obama.16
Obama officials did not go so far as their GOP rival, but secretary of state John Kerry, UN ambassador Samantha Power, and to some extent CIA director John Brennan all believed limited military force was better than inaction. But the Pentagon – and the president – remained unconvinced that conventional US military action, either to destroy ISIS or to support the Syrian opposition, was worth the risk of escalation and blowback.17
In lieu of invasion, Obama turned to special operations – a hallmark of his post-Bush military doctrine. In November 2015, the Obama administration began the deployment of U.S. special forces to Syria, with the mission of assisting rebel forces in their fight against ISIS. He then ordered several dozen Special Operations troops into Rojava (in northern Syria) to assist local fighters battling ISIS there. In doing so, Obama ordered the first open-ended mission by US ground forces into the country.18 These forces would come to number roughly five hundred by the end of 2016.19 While they certainly contributed to the fighting (they seemed to specialize in assassinating ISIS leaders), ultimately such a small number of soldiers did not prove decisive. Other mechanisms were needed.
Making a virtue of necessity, US officials also tried to work with the Russians. Looked at through the lens of narrow bilateral cooperation (which is how the Russia Reset viewed the world), cooperation between Russia and the West seemed like a no-brainer. Both sides had a common enemy; surely they could work together, as they had with New START or the Iranian Nuclear Deal, to eradicate this nascent terror state.
From the US perspective, this policy risked weakening at least some anti-Assad groups that were friendly to the US, granted, but it also held out the prospect of crushing ISIS. The new secretary of defense, Ash Carter, disagreed with secretary of state Kerry that Russian assistance was worth pursuing. He suspected Russian intentions and didn’t think the US had a lot to gain in cooperating with them. He also pointed out that the US had put the kibosh on military cooperation with Russia since Putin’s 2014 annexation of Crimea (which we’ll discuss in more detail in the next video). Kerry retorted that the economic sanctions on Russia would remain in place and emphasized that the number one concern should be “killing the terrorists faster.”20 Obama ultimately sided with Kerry, and military cooperation with Russia was pursued.
The Kremlin had other ideas, however. Russia, as ever, was not willing to cooperate from what it saw as an inferior position. Russia therefore insisted that the West should cease its demand for regime change in Syria. Assad was an ally of Russia; Russia protected its friends; and as a great power, its friends should be safe from undue interference from the West.
Despite this fundamental difference in perception, an attempt at bilateral cooperation was made. Between 2015 and 2016 both countries tried to cooperate in brokering ceasefires. On September 10, 2016, a year after Russia began its Syrian expedition, the United States and Russia signed an agreement aimed at both reducing the violence in Syria and bringing the two nations into closer cooperation in the fight against ISIS. The US and Russia also established the center for operational coordination against the Islamic State so that both sides could better coordinate their campaigns. Alas, this “potential turning point,” as secretary Kerry called it, was to no avail. Weeks later came the news that the Syrian and Russian air forces had pummeled the city of Aleppo, retaking it for Assad. In response the State Department announced that it was suspending talks with Moscow regarding the cease-fire and shutting down the recently established coordination center.21
International negotiation efforts at Vienna and later Geneva during this period also failed to produce anything substantial, hampered once again by fundamental differences between the policy objectives of the West (NATO, US, EU) and the Rest (in this case, Russia and Iran).
By 2016 ISIS, which only a few years earlier had appeared to be nearly unstoppable in northern and eastern Syria, had buckled under the weight of simultaneous confrontations with three rival coalitions:
Kurdish forces and their US allies;
Pro-Assad Syrian forces supported by Iran and Russia;
A Turkish-backed coalition of rebel groups.
After 2016 its once-vaunted battlefield prowess had all but collapsed. Meanwhile, thanks to the decisive impact of Russian air power (and soldiers from Iran and Hezbollah), Assad had regained his footing and seemed on the upswing in the Syrian Civil War. Yet the hydra-headed conflict continued to hemorrhage the nation well past the end of Obama’s presidency.22
Conclusion
To sum up, the fighting in Syria began as an outgrowth of the Arab Spring protests, with thousands of Syrians protesting and then fighting against the Syrian government. So long as the conflict remained predominantly between rebel groups and Assad’s government, the United States under Obama refrained from direct intervention, even after the documented use of chemical weapons by Assad prompted Obama to try and obtain Congressional approval to attack Assad. ISIS changed the situation, prompting Obama to provide material assistance to rebels while also engaging US-led forces in air strikes against ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq. Fearing for their client, Russia augmented its existing support for Assad with soldiers and aircraft. Obama responded both by attempting to cooperate with Russia against ISIS and by sending hundreds special operators into the country. By the end of Obama’s tenure, the initial conflict between citizens and their government had mutated into a three-way slugging match with no end in sight.
Syria itself, of course, was left utterly devastated, with thousands dead or wounded and millions made refugee, fleeing into neighboring countries or braving the sea for a chance at safety in Europe. As is so often the case in history, these desperate people were often treated as an invading barbarian horde – even in apparently enlightened Europe. A rightward shift in European politics followed in their wake.
As for US-Russia relations, the conflict was another major blow to the bilateral cooperation that had been the goal of Obama’s Russia Reset. Russia had still been a diplomatic partner of sorts when it came to Assad’s chemical weapons, but its UN vetoes, support for Assad, and military expedition to Syria all strained relations with the West. And, unlike disagreements over missile defense which only sporadically grabbed news headlines, the disagreements Obama and Putin had over Syria made the nightly news. The Reset was breaking down in a very public way.
Events in Ukraine would only foster more conflict between the world’s two largest nuclear powers…That will be the subject of Part Four.
Rabinovich, Itamar and Valensi, Carmit, Syrian Requiem: The Civil War and Its Aftermath, Chapter 2
The Obama White House, “Moment of Opportunity: American Diplomacy in the Middle East & North Africa,” May 19, 2011, https://tinyurl.com/y5xsmzwk
C-SPAN, “Situation in Syria,” August 18, 2011, https://tinyurl.com/9jz7c63
Al Jazeera, “Obama calls on Syria’s Assad to step aside,” August 18, 2011, https://tinyurl.com/ms6ps5es
Clinton, Hillary, Hard Choices Chap 19
Ibid., Chap 19
Rabinovich and Valensi, Syrian Requiem, Chapter 2
Panetta and Newton, Worthy Fights, Chapter 17
Obama Presidential Speeches 2013 Vol 2, 986
Obama Presidential Speeches 2013 Vol 2, 987
Larson and Shevchenko, Quest for Status, pp 222
Willians, Brian Glyn, Counter Jihad: America’s Military Experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, pp 272
Geukjian, Ohannes, The Russian Military Intervention in Syria, Chapter 2
Ibid., Chapter 4
Ibid.
FRANCE 24 English, “Exclusive interview: John McCain calls for 10,000 US ground troops in Syria",” November 19, 2015, https://tinyurl.com/mptsnvsa
Kerry, Every Day is Extra, Chapter 19
Baker, Peter, Cooper, Helene and Sanger, David E., “Obama Sends Special Operations Forces to Help Fight ISIS in Syria, October 30, 2015, https://tinyurl.com/3bs7s7c6
Martinez, Luis, “Why 200 More US Troops Are Going to Syria,” December 12, 2016, https://tinyurl.com/bd95cr33
Kerry, Every Day is Extra, Chapter 19
Rabinovich and Valensi, Syrian Requiem, Chapter 2
Ibid.